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Watergate and Vietnam: The Cold War
Origins of a
Constitutional Crisis
Stephen M. Griffin*
Watergate is usually thought of as the scandal and constitutional crisis
which followed the June 1972 burglary of the Democratic National
Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. by
persons associated with President Nixon’s reelection committee and the
subsequent cover-up, led by Nixon himself, of White House involvement in
the burglary.
As such, it is regarded as a domestic crisis centrally involving
President Nixon’s efforts to undermine his political opponents.1 Legal
scholars at least are not familiar with the substantial evidence showing that
the origin of much (though certainly not all) of what we call “Watergate”
lies in the foreign policy of the Johnson and Nixon administrations.2 It has
long been appreciated by historians of the Vietnam War that there was a
meaningful link between Watergate and the domestic intelligence
operations used to counter the war’s critics.3 In this respect, there is a case
to be made that this symposium should have been held in 2011, the fortieth
anniversary of the White House-ordered break-in to the office of Daniel
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in Los Angeles.
In this essay, I situate Watergate within the context of the Cold War
and the Vietnam War in particular. This perspective might be called

* Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School. Copyright by
Harvard University Press. All rights reserved. I thank the participants at the conference for their
comments. This essay is drawn from a larger project on war powers. The project is based on an
extensive review of diplomatic history and is tentatively titled Long Wars and the Constitution:
Presidents and the Constitutional Order From Truman to Obama (Harvard University Press,
forthcoming 2013).
1 See, e.g., WILLIAM BUNDY, A TANGLED WEB: THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
NIXON PRESIDENCY 470 (1998); JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND 371 (2009).
2 BUNDY, supra note 1, at 472.
3 See GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM,
1950–1975, at 299–300 (4th ed. 2002); ROBERT MANN, A GRAND DELUSION: AMERICA’S DESCENT
INTO VIETNAM 687 (2001); MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE VIETNAM WARS: 1945–1990, at 238, 260–61
(1991).
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“Watergate as foreign policy.” Certainly Nixon’s misdeeds ran in many
directions besides those connected with the June 1972 burglary.4 To see
Watergate afresh and understand how it makes sense as a crisis of what I
call the “Cold War constitutional order” requires some rearranging of
standard understandings.
The premises of the Cold War order, generally supported by the
public, required presidents to have the ability to respond if necessary with
the full panoply of military force to the challenge of communist
expansion.5 President Johnson was simply the latest heir to this legacy.6
When the Vietnam War did not go as expected, the presidency became a
cockpit of tension and frustration.7 The strains of war led Johnson and his
successor Richard Nixon to a fixated concern with internal security. They
turned the capacities of the intelligence agencies, built-up during the Cold
War, inward against American citizens.8 This was one of the key causes of
Watergate.9
This essay elaborates on this foreign policy explanation of Watergate
in three parts. In Part I, the scene is set by showing how an increased
concern with internal security by both the Johnson and Nixon
administrations flowed from the Vietnam War. Part II concentrates on the
Nixon administration and sets Watergate within the context of Nixon’s
foreign policy and the Cold War more generally. Part III explains why
Watergate was a genuine constitutional crisis and how it, somewhat
ironically, came to interfere with Nixon’s conduct of foreign policy.
I. FROM JOHNSON TO NIXON: VIETNAM AND INTERNAL SECURITY
War imposes unique psychological stress on the inhabitant of the Oval
Office. The risks attendant to war and the personal responsibility that any
President would feel for the men and women under his command tend to
occupy the mind and crowd out everything else. Because LBJ and his top
advisers made the decision for war without any meaningful participation by

4 For useful accounts of the events surrounding the Watergate scandal, see generally FRED
EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON
(1995); KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997); STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE
WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON (1990) [hereinafter KUTLER,
WATERGATE]; STANLEY I. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER: THE NEW NIXON TAPES (1997) [hereinafter
KUTLER, ABUSE]; J. ANTHONY LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS (1988);
MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEMORY: HOW WE REMEMBER, FORGET, AND
RECONSTRUCT THE PAST (1992).
5 See Stephen M. Griffin, Reconceiving the War Powers Debate 39–40 (Tulane Univ. School of
Law,
Working
Paper
No.
11-06),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1943652http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1943652http://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1943652.
6 ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES, 1961–1973, at 105–06
(1998) [hereinafter DALLEK, JOHNSON].
7 Id. at 155–56.
8 EMERY, supra note 4, at 4–5.
9 See id.

Do Not Delete

30

8/1/2012 8:21 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 16:1

Congress, the stress was all the greater.10 Consider that fewer than six
months after his muted July 1965 announcement that he was escalating the
war, LBJ and his administration were under extraordinary strain.11 Even in
the fall of 1965, the administration could sense that the public was not
strongly behind the war.12 While this may have troubled them, it would not
matter if their expectations of quickly forcing North Vietnam to negotiate
had worked as planned.13 When this did not occur by the end of the year,
the administration plunged into a series of recriminations and a fruitless
debate about a bombing halt.14
Somewhat unexpectedly, the decision for war had narrowed the range
of options available to the President. Once LBJ chose bombing as the
method to force North Vietnam to negotiate, bombing had to work.15 This
had the further effect of making administration policy hostage to the
responses of the governments in both South and North Vietnam. 16 LBJ
could sense that now he had to win or his presidency would be forever
discredited.17 A war fever took hold in the executive branch, creating a
vicious circle, which undermined effective policymaking as officials saw
that the President wanted only good news and interpreted new
developments in their most favorable light.18 It did not help that they were
susceptible to the same distortions in viewpoint that afflicted the President;
they also knew that their personal credibility was on the line.19
Under the strains of war, the Johnson administration’s attitude toward
critics took a hard set. By early 1966, LBJ thought that Senate critics such
as J. William Fulbright were actually under communist influence.20 The
ideological domestic downside of the Cold War associated with
McCarthyism had returned with a vengeance. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover encouraged LBJ in his belief
that critics of the war were subversives and operated from the worst
motives.21 All of the major intelligence agencies—the FBI, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), as well as
the Army—developed covert domestic intelligence programs aimed at

DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 155–56, 283.
Id. at 344–45.
12 Id. at 290–91.
13 See id. at 284–85.
14 See id. at 345–46.
15 See id. at 343.
16 See id. at 240–41.
17 See FREDRIK LOGEVALL, CHOOSING WAR: THE LOST CHANCE FOR PEACE AND THE
ESCALATION OF WAR IN VIETNAM 369–70 (1999).
18 DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 103, 356–57, 377–78, 388, 470–71; LOGEVALL, supra
note 17, at 370–72. See also DAVID KAISER, AMERICAN TRAGEDY: KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE VIETNAM WAR 460–61 (2000).
19 See DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 470; KAISER, supra note 18, at 462; LOGEVALL, supra
note 17, at 389.
20 DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 352.
21 Id. at 367.
10
11

Do Not Delete

2012]

8/1/2012 8:21 PM

Watergate and Vietnam

31

monitoring and disrupting opposition to the war.22 Presidents Johnson and
Nixon both believed that the antiwar movement was inspired by agents of
international communism.23 When careful investigation by the intelligence
agencies showed this to be false, they in effect ordered the agencies to
prove the relationship.24
How did the strains of war and internal security affect Nixon?25 When
he took office, there were still well over 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam
with combat action continuing at a high tempo.26 Nixon rejected the option
of a quick withdrawal in favor of a strategy that had several elements in
pursuit of his overall goal of “peace with honor”—a negotiated settlement
in which the North Vietnamese would somehow be persuaded to withdraw
their forces and guarantee the viability of the South Vietnamese
government.27 Roughly, Nixon’s policy with respect to Vietnam was to
satisfy domestic pressure for an end to the war by withdrawing U.S. forces,
but slowly enough to preserve meaningful military options.28 To
compensate for the withdrawal, the U.S. would build up South Vietnam’s
ability to resist, a process of “Vietnamization,” which had begun under
Johnson.29 More ambitiously, Nixon wanted to reframe the war against a
new global strategy of détente with the Soviet Union and opening relations
with China. He felt sure that these leading communist states could bring
pressure to bear on North Vietnam.30
Sooner than Nixon anticipated, his Vietnam strategy involved him in
new military responses, as North Vietnam continued to exert significant
pressure—especially by using its sanctuaries in Cambodia, which was
nonetheless a neutral country.31 At the same time, the reaction of the
antiwar movement and the public generally was always a concern.32 So

Id. at 486–87.
Id. at 489 (discussing   Johnson’s   beliefs);;   MELVIN SMALL, THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD
NIXON 70  (1999)  (discussing  Nixon’s  beliefs).
24 DALLEK, JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 489; SMALL, supra note 23, at 70.
25 For  histories  of  Nixon’s  administration  and  foreign  policy,  see generally BUNDY, supra note 2;
ROBERT DALLEK, NIXON AND KISSINGER: PARTNERS IN POWER (2007) [hereinafter DALLEK, NIXON];
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, DÉTENTE AND CONFRONTATION: AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM
NIXON TO REAGAN (rev. ed. 1994); DAVID GREENBERG, NIXON’S SHADOW: THE HISTORY OF AN
IMAGE (2003); JEFFREY KIMBALL, NIXON’S VIETNAM WAR (1998); RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND:
THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING OF AMERICA (2008); SMALL, supra note 23. For
useful memoirs and biographies, see generally WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY (2005);
RICHARD NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON (1978).
26 Henry
Kissinger,
Vietnam’s  
Lessons,  
L.A.
TIMES,
May
31,
2007,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-kissinger31may31,0,3265672.story.
27 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 72–73.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 73; see Military: 1969 – Vietnamization, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (May 7, 2011, 2:05
PM), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/vietnam2-vietnamization.htm.
30 Don
Keko,
Nixon
and
Détente,
EXAMINER.COM
(Aug.
12,
2001),
http://www.examiner.com/american-history-in-national/nixon-and-detente
31 President Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia,
MEKONG.NET, http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/nixon430.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
32 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 166.
22
23

Do Not Delete

32

8/1/2012 8:21 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 16:1

when Nixon decided to bomb Cambodia early in 1969, his first year in
office, he determined it would have to be conducted in secret, something
difficult to do with a major military operation.33 When news of the
operation leaked, Nixon was upset and ordered FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover to wiretap the phones of administration aides and journalists.34
Major antiwar protests were scheduled for the fall of 1969. At roughly
the same moment, Nixon was considering “Duck Hook,” a major strike to
force North Vietnam to settle the war on U.S. terms.35 Nixon knew that
this expansion would require unusual “mental resolve” and a “go-for-broke
public relations campaign, in which he would have to expend most or all of
his political capital to survive ‘the heat.’”36 Duck Hook was dropped, but
the idea of the decisive intervention remained.37 Nixon appreciated by the
end of 1969 that the war was now his responsibility in full.38 Taking
control of the war amid hostile domestic opposition would mean going on
the offensive both abroad and at home.39 In April 1970, Nixon ordered
U.S. troops to invade border regions in Cambodia to eliminate the North
Vietnamese sanctuaries.40 It was characteristic of Nixon’s Vietnam
strategy that all of these deliberations occurred in secret; thus Nixon shared
his plans with very few people other than Henry Kissinger, his National
Security Advisor.41 This occasioned intense stress, as Nixon considered it
an operation he knew would be perceived as expanding the war.42
Nixon did not foresee how much crisis management the Cambodian
invasion would impose on his administration. Universities all over the U.S.
demonstrated in protest and several of Kissinger’s aides resigned.43 Under
considerable pressure, Nixon began to act erratically.44 In the period
leading up to the invasion, he seemed hyperactive to his subordinates,
indulging in an “aggressive mania” as he attempted to steel himself for
ordering a major military operation without congressional or public
support.45 The invasion of Cambodia was perceived, not without cause, as
a major expansion of the war by members of Congress and the antiwar
movement.46 The unprecedented backlash and public protest that was the
DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 118; KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 131.
KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 136.
Id. at 159.
36 Id. at 160.
37 Id. at 170–71.
38 Id. at 169–70.
39 Id. at 170.
40 Context  of  ‘April  24–30, 1970: Nixon Orders Invasion of Cambodia; Kissinger Staffers Resign
Rather  
than  
Participate  
in  
Coordination’,
HISTORY
COMMONS,
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a04242670parrotsbeak&scale=2#a04242670parrotsb
eak (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
41 Id.
42 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 196–97.
43 Id. at 213.
44 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 198–200, 205; ISAACSON, supra note 25, at 260–62.
45 See KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 204.
46 See id. at 221.
33
34
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result of the Cambodian invasion was the turning point that gave significant
credibility and impetus to efforts already underway to curb the war-making
power of the executive branch.47
It was at this moment, amid the superheated atmosphere produced by
the Cambodian invasion, when Nixon summoned the chiefs of the major
intelligence agencies to chastise them for not cooperating more effectively
against the nation’s domestic enemies.48 It would have been appropriate for
Nixon to raise this issue with respect to foreign enemies, as the lack of
cooperation between Hoover’s FBI and the CIA had been causing trouble
for many years.49 But like Johnson, Nixon was convinced that the antiwar
movement was inspired and led by communist agents.50 Not only was this
false, a fact that the intelligence agencies had already confirmed, but it also
illustrated the Nixon administration’s isolation from reasonable voices
within the antiwar movement with which it could have had a meaningful
dialogue about how to wind down the Vietnam War.51 Nixon, however,
had worked himself into such a temper that he saw antiwar protesters on
campuses as terrorists threatening the state itself.52 As summarized by
historian Jeffrey Kimball, “[t]he Vietnam War heightened Nixon’s sense of
world crisis, contributed to his emotional tension, compounded his
personality disorders, and influenced his stratagems and tactics for dealing
with home-front and foreign issues.”53
The solution to the lack of cooperation among the intelligence
agencies was later known as the Huston Plan, after the White House aide
who wrote it at Nixon’s direction.54 The plan called for the centralization
of domestic intelligence activities in the White House and involved
aggressive, illegal measures such as break-ins to combat domestic protest.55
When FBI Director Hoover objected, fearing disclosure of illegal activities,
the plan was formally abandoned.56 Informally, however, these options
continued to percolate at the White House.57 If the intelligence agencies
would not take suitable action on their own, the White House itself would
go operational and conduct break-ins and wiretaps in pursuit of information
that would discredit its political enemies.58 This effort was a principal
origin of what came to be known as Watergate.59
Id. at 220–21.
KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 98–99.
SMALL, supra note 23, at 56.
Tom Wells, Running Battle: Washington’s   War   at   Home, in LONG TIME GONE: SIXTIES
AMERICA THEN AND NOW 75, 89 (Alexander Bloom ed., 2001).
51 SMALL, supra note 23, at 70.
52 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 208; GREENBERG, supra note 25, at 82.
53 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 225.
54 See KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 96–101 (detailing the Huston Plan).
55 LUKAS, supra note 4, at 33.
56 Id. at 32–34.
57 Id. at 35–37.
58 See id.
59 See generally PERLSTEIN, supra note 25.
47
48
49
50
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II. NIXON, THE COLD WAR, AND WATERGATE
To understand Nixon’s presidency in the context of the Cold War, we
should keep in mind that Nixon always intended to be a foreign affairs
President. He wanted to be remembered in history as someone who
brought peace to the United States and the world.60 Nixon retained beliefs
with respect to foreign policy that he had formed as Senator, and as VicePresident in the Eisenhower administration.61 He accepted the verities of
the Cold War and saw the conflict between the United States and
communist countries as central.62 At the same time, he perceived strategic
opportunities arising from the relatively new conflict between the Soviet
Union and China.63 Nixon saw Vietnam in this context. It was a war he
had to settle, but on a global basis with terms favorable to the U.S.64
It was crucial to Nixon’s conception of his presidency that he wanted
to carry out this far-reaching strategy entirely in secret in order to announce
it at the right moment to secure his place as one of the greatest presidents in
history, confound his political opponents, and achieve reelection.65 This
meant that during his administration an enormous amount of diplomatic
and military activity occurred off the bureaucratic books.66 This did not
bother Nixon, as he entered office with grievances against a number of
government agencies centrally important to foreign policy, such as the
State Department and the CIA, which he felt had mistreated him as VicePresident.67 Partly for this reason, he resolved to be his own Secretary of
State and he and Kissinger centralized control of foreign affairs and
national security policy in the White House.68 The State and Defense
Departments, as well as the CIA, were often cut out of both formulating
and implementing policy.69 The White House and especially the national
security staff thus went “operational” in foreign affairs from the beginning
of Nixon’s presidency.
This organizational setup assisted Nixon in making swift, decisive
moves to advance U.S. interests. With respect to intelligence policy, for
example, John Ranelagh makes the valuable point that although the CIA
had become something of a status quo agency by the late 1960s, Nixon did
GARTHOFF, supra note 25, at 30; SMALL, supra note 23, at 60–62.
See America and the Cold War: The Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy Years, ACADEMIC
AMERICAN, http://www.academicamerican.com/postww2/coldwar.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2012)
(describing the views on foreign policy which were dominant while Nixon was Vice-President).
62 JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 546 (1987); ROBERT D.
SCHULZINGER, A TIME FOR WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1941–1975, at 332 (1997).
63 SMALL, supra note 23, at 64–65; Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/prc-soviet.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
64 See SMALL, supra note 23, at 65.
65 Cf. id at 61–62.
66 See id. at 54.
67 Id. at 55; DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 84.
68 See DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 84–85; SMALL, supra note 28, at 51–52.
69 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 84–85; SMALL, supra note 23, at 51–52; RANELAGH, supra
note 62, at 499–501, 538–39, 540–41.
60
61
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not want to be a status quo President.70 He wanted aggressive action to
create a more favorable balance of power.71 Historian Kimball has argued
persuasively that Nixon’s “madman theory” of exercising power in
unpredictable ways was related to the Eisenhower administration’s
“massive retaliation” policy.72 While Nixon saw himself as an American
Charles de Gaulle, a world leader in the grand European manner, his chief
diplomat Kissinger thought the primary objective of the government was
order.73 Neither Nixon nor Kissinger believed in democratic governance in
foreign affairs in the sense of building support for their policy in Congress
and the Senate.74
Any breach in the wall of secrecy around the White House, and thus
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s diplomatic efforts was therefore a mortal threat.75
It was all the worse if the breach could be traced to someone who was part
of the antiwar movement, a movement which to them was inspired by
foreign communists and led by revolutionary terrorists.76 Thus the
administration had a severe reaction in June 1971 to Daniel Ellsberg’s
leaking of the Pentagon Papers to major newspapers including the New
York Times.77 The Papers were a secret Department of Defense history of
the Vietnam War ordered by Robert McNamara during the Johnson
administration.78 Nixon commanded his aides to destroy Ellsberg’s
credibility and, by extension, the credibility of the antiwar movement in the
eyes of the public.79 Unbelievably, Nixon and his aides planned to dig up
information on both Ellsberg and the Johnson administration by
committing illegal break-ins.80
Nixon’s remarks on the Pentagon Papers and Ellsberg, recorded by his
taping system in the White House, leave an indelible and disturbing
impression. Nixon believed the young lawyers on his team did not have
the proper attitude:
These kids don’t understand. They have no understanding of politics. They have
no understanding of public relations. John Mitchell is that way. John is always
worried about is it technically correct? Do you think, for Christ sakes, that the
New York Times is worried about all the legal niceties? Those sons of bitches are

See RANELAGH, supra note 62, at 546.
Id. at 546, 552; KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 33.
See KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 76–77; Francis A Boyle, The Relevance of International Law
to  the  ‘Paradox’  of  Nuclear  Deterrence, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1407, 1413 (1986).
73 BUNDY, supra note 1, at 517; ISAACSON, supra note 25, at 45; KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 2,
148; SMALL, supra note 23, at 61–62.
74 ISAACSON, supra note 25, at 206–07, 327, 486–87; KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 189; SMALL,
supra note 23, at 61–62, 242.
75 DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 208.
76 Id.
77 See KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 3–37; KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 110.
78 Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional Liberties
and the Rule of Law, 1 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1981).
79 See KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 3–37.
80 Id.
70
71
72
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killing me. I mean, thank God, I leaked to the press [during the Hiss
controversy]. This is what we’ve got to get—I want you to shake these
(unintelligible) up around here. Now you do it. Shake them up. Get them off
their Goddamn dead asses and say now that isn’t what you should be talking
about. We’re up against an enemy, a conspiracy. They’re using any means. We
are going to use any means. Is that clear?81

Nixon went on to refer to a scheme to burglarize the Brookings
Institution, a Washington think tank, to retrieve classified documents on
Vietnam he believed might be in its possession.82 He continued, “Did they
get the Brookings Institute raided last night? No. Get it done. I want it
done. I want the Brookings Institute’s safe cleaned out and have it cleaned
out in a way that it makes somebody else [responsible?].”83
The Special Investigative Unit (commonly known as “the Plumbers”),
a team set up in the White House to combat leaks, was available to conduct
the projected break-ins.84 One was carried out in September 1971—a
burglary of the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in Los Angeles.85 Once this
occurred, Nixon and his men were ensnared in a criminal conspiracy.86
Everyone involved in the operation knew something that could be of mortal
danger to Nixon and his top aides in the White House.87 Historians have
argued that when the burglary at the Watergate complex was discovered in
June 1972, Nixon had to lead a cover-up of this operation to ensure that the
links between the Ellsberg and Watergate burglaries would not be
discovered.88
These operations were carried out in the main by E. Howard Hunt,
89
who had recently retired from the CIA. Hunt had participated in various
CIA operations, including the Bay of Pigs.90 Nixon and his aides believed
that Hunt could be relied on to carry out the kind of operations originally
anticipated in the Huston plan.91 When Hunt needed men to help him, he
turned to Cubans who had been trained by the CIA to commit acts of
sabotage against Castro.92 Many of these same people were involved in the
1972 break-in at the Watergate complex along with James McCord, a
93
former chief of security at the CIA.

81 Id. at 8. John Mitchell was the Attorney General. John Newton Mitchell, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistpage.php?id=66 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
82 See KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 8.
83 Id.
84 KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 111–12; KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 28.
85 KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 28.
86 See NIXON, supra note 25, at 841–42.
87 SMALL, supra note 23, at 238, 276.
88 See e.g., SMALL, supra note 23, at 238, 276. For  Nixon’s  remarks  in  his  memoirs  see  NIXON,
supra note 25, at 841–42.
89 RANELAGH, supra note 62, at 521.
90 Id.
91 See KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 3–6, 27–28.
92 LUKAS, supra note 4, at 94–97.
93 SMALL, supra note 23, at 255.
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After the Watergate burglars were arrested, the leading idea among
Nixon’s men was to quash the FBI investigation by claiming that
Watergate was a CIA operation having to do with the Bay of Pigs.94 Nixon
was later convicted in the court of public opinion by the disclosure of a
June 23, 1972 tape in which Nixon ordered his chief of staff, H. R.
Haldeman, to order the CIA to carry out this plan.95 CIA Director Richard
Helms and his deputy Vernon Walters were confident that Watergate had
nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs and resisted White House overtures to
assist with the cover-up.96
Ironically, there was an important sense in which Watergate did relate
to the Bay of Pigs. The various break-ins were carefully planned, requiring
training, discipline, and knowledge of specialized equipment.97 The men
carrying them out could not be ordinary criminals—that would leave the
administration too vulnerable to involvement with unpredictable characters.
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations invested significant resources in
training a covert army of operatives against Castro.98 After the Bay of Pigs
invasion failed in 1961, these operatives were based in the Miami area.99
In this respect, the Cold War efforts against Castro, particularly in the
Kennedy administration, became braided together with Nixon’s efforts to
destroy domestic opposition to his war policies in a very dangerous way. It
is likely that the break-ins could not have occurred as they did had these
operatives, accustomed to living above the law, not been available to the
administration.100 The Cuban operatives were hard-line anticommunists
who perhaps believed they were acting to protect the United States against
the communist-inspired antiwar movement.101
Nevertheless, once they were caught, the imperatives of a criminal
conspiracy took over.102 This put the President of the United States in the
incredible position of being vulnerable to blackmail by the Watergate
burglars.103 The country was fortunate that Hunt and his fellow
conspirators simply wanted Nixon to give them money to pay for their
defense and expenses.104 Suppose they had wanted changes in government
policy? This dire possibility was a logical consequence of the President
becoming involved in a conspiracy to break the law.

KUTLER, ABUSE, supra note 4, at 61–62, 67–70.
Id. at 67–70. See also KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 218.
KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 221; RANELAGH, supra note 62, at 522–30; SMALL,
supra note 23, at 277.
97 See LUKAS, supra note 4, at 94–101, 190–93, 196–200.
98 Id. at 95.
99 Id. at 95–96.
100 Id. at 94–96.
101 See KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 254.
102 Id. at 248–49 (detailing issues such  as  “hush  money”).
103 Id. at 249.
104 See id.
94
95
96
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If Watergate had simply been a matter of the June 1972 burglary and
the subsequent rather improvised cover-up, it might be appropriate to view
it as an external hindrance to the administration’s foreign policy
initiatives.105 But Watergate was inextricably connected with the foreign
policy of the Nixon administration and thus with the Cold War itself.106
The maintenance of the Cold War, and any conventional war such as
Vietnam, required an enormous effort on the part of the government to
maintain morale on the domestic front.107 President Truman had the public
behind him when he went to war in Korea in June 1950, despite the lack of
congressional authorization, given that the preceding three years had seen a
rising public concern over the communist challenge.108 Nixon’s task of
garnering public support for military actions in Vietnam was far more
difficult, and thus suggested the waning of the Cold War. He knew the
Vietnam War was unpopular and that the end would at least have to be in
sight by the time he ran for reelection.109 He decided to combat the antiwar
movement with all the means available to him, including intelligence
capabilities built since the 1950s.110 This pushed the entire political system
into a constitutional crisis.111
III. WATERGATE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
Watergate has been regarded as a paradigm case of a constitutional
crisis, not simply in the heat of the moment, but in the sober reflection of
history.112 However, a few knowledgeable and historically-minded
scholars have surprisingly claimed that it was not.113 The problem with
these accounts may be an overemphasis on the fact that the Watergate crisis
ended in Nixon’s prospective impeachment and resignation, procedures
allowed by the Constitution, rather than with riots and troops in the
streets.114 Although we can be thankful that Nixon did not attempt to retain

105 This appears to be the view of diplomatic historians with experience in government. See
BUNDY, supra note 1, at 470; GARTHOFF, supra note 25, at 458–59, 485.
106 See GARTHOFF, supra note 25, at 458–59.
107 See, e.g., KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 165–67 (discussing having Nixon speak at universities
and devising a POW plan to help alleviate negative public opinion over the Vietnam War).
108 GARY R. HESS, PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS FOR WAR 31–32 (2d ed. 2009).
109 KIMBALL, supra note 25, at 62; SMALL, supra note 23, at 64–67.
110 See supra Part I.
111 See generally Griffin, supra note 1.
112 See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 25, at 333–34; John W. Dean, forward to WATERGATE AND
THE RESIGNATION OF RICHARD NIXON: IMPACT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, at x (Harry P. Jeffrey &
Thomas Maxwell Long eds., 2004); KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 25, at 209, 316; THOMAS E.
MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH 118–19 (2006); SEAN WILENTZ, THE AGE OF
REAGAN 8 (2008).
113 See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 712,
742 (2009) (calling the events and aftermath of Watergate a political crisis); Keith E. Whittington, Yet
Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093,  2131  n.175   (2002)   (stating  that   “the  
Nixon episode led to substantial constitutional conflict, and eventually to constitutional change, but not
to crisis”).
114 U.S. CONST. art 2, § 4 (discussing impeachment of the President, Vice-President and civil
officers of the U.S.); U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (stating that if the President should, among other
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his office by force, the inescapable constitutional aspect of Watergate was
how all of the circumstances I have highlighted flowed from Nixon’s abuse
of his office, an office whose powers had been greatly altered by the post1945 constitutional order. Nixon’s extreme abuse of his powers was not
the only reason Watergate was a constitutional crisis; the consequences of
Watergate also mattered. One consequence was that it rendered Nixon
ineffective as President, especially with respect to foreign policy.115
By the time of Nixon’s inauguration for his second term in January
1973, the Watergate cover-up was in a deep predicament.116 The blackmail
demands of the burglars were escalating and various parties in the White
House saw themselves as under threat of being implicated in the coverup.117 As a result, Nixon would be effective as President for only three
more months. At the beginning of the pivotal month of April 1973,
Nixon’s popularity and standing with the public were still intact.118 But
Nixon had conceded to his chief of staff H. R. Haldeman that governance
would become impossible if public pressure increased.119 By the end of the
month, a mounting series of disclosures had forced him to dismiss
Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, his two most essential aides.120
After the dismissal of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Nixon sank into a
depression and for some periods could not function as President.121 During
the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Nixon was incapacitated by the sudden
crisis, which followed from his dismissal of special prosecutor Archibald
Cox, and was unable to make crucial foreign policy decisions.122 Another
special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, was appointed, and Nixon’s time in
office (until his resignation in August 1974) was consumed by
Watergate.123 He could not take meaningful action, for example, in
addressing the serious energy crisis in the winter of 1973, which was the
consequence of the war in the Middle East.124
Watergate was also a constitutional crisis because in some sense,
Nixon willed it to be. Arguably like other conservatives during the 1970s,
he sensed the high degree of entrenchment liberals had achieved in

things, resign, the Vice-President shall become President).
115 See GARTHOFF, supra note 25, at 458–59.
116 KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 247–51.
117 Id.
118 SMALL, supra note 23, at 282.
119 KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 263.
120 Id. at 318–20.
121 See DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 544–45; KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 324–
25; SMALL, supra note 23, at 270–71.    See  also  Nixon’s  revealing  comments  in  his  memoirs.   NIXON,
supra note 25, at 848–49.
122 BUNDY, supra note 1, at 433, 440; DALLEK, NIXON, supra note 25, at 522, 528; ISAACSON,
supra note 25, at 514, 531.
123 ISAACSON, supra note 25, at 514; KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 427–29.
124 See FRANKLIN TUGWELL, THE ENERGY CRISIS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY:
POLITICS AND MARKETS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 105 (1988).
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institutions both inside and outside the government.125 It is likely he was
weary of struggling with a persisting Democratic Congress and the interest
groups that supported the Democratic Party. After the 1972 election in
particular, he was obsessed with seeking revenge on the many people and
groups whom he believed had wronged him.126 As he recounted in his
memoirs: “In this second term I had thrown down a gauntlet to Congress,
the bureaucracy, the media, and the Washington establishment and
challenged them to engage in epic battle.”127 Another self-willed moment
of crisis occurred when Nixon fired special prosecutor Cox and earned the
whirlwind of an impeachment inquiry.128 The significant point is that
Nixon deliberately generated crises as a way of coping with the unwelcome
reality that there were effective limits on his ability to reorder the policy
universe. He certainly had no scruples about challenging any checks and
balances the original Constitution put in his way. This was the most
fundamental reason why “Watergate”—Nixon’s way of managing the
burdens of the Cold War—was a constitutional crisis, but one intimately
linked to the pursuit of the nation’s foreign policy.
CONCLUSION
Watergate can be usefully understood as part of an immense drama in
which the constitutional order with respect to foreign policy and war
powers founded after 1945 became increasingly unstable. The appalling
costs of the Vietnam War and the crash of Nixon’s presidency showed the
jerry-built and provisional character of the Cold War constitutional order.
The qualitative difference that war makes to government reasserted itself
with a vengeance and showed that the kind of deliberation allowed by the
post-1945 order was shockingly inadequate. The premises of the Cold War
order would never again be sufficient by themselves to compel the nation
to engage in conventional war. A further consequence was the crippling
legacy of the loss of trust in government. While Vietnam and Watergate
were not the only causes of the decline of trust in government in the 1960s
and 1970s, they were significant contributors to a decline that was
permanent in the sense that it has never been restored to the level prevailing
before the war.129 In this respect, we are still dealing with the
consequences of Vietnam and Watergate.

NIXON, supra note 25, at 761–62.
ISAACSON, supra note 25, at 474.
NIXON, supra note 25, at 850.
KUTLER, WATERGATE, supra note 4, at 427–29.
See Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
475, 480–81 (2000).
125
126
127
128
129

